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We study the incentives of national retail chains to adopt national (uniform) prices
across local markets that differ in size and competition intensity. In addition to price,
the chains may also compete along a quality dimension, and quality is always set
locally. We show that absent quality competition, the chains will never use national
pricing. However, if quality competition is suffi ciently strong there exist equilibria
where at least one of the chains adopts national pricing. We also identify cases in
which national pricing benefits (harms) all consumers, even in markets where such a
pricing strategy leads to higher (lower) prices.
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1 Introduction
National pricing occurs when a firm, say a chain-store, adopts a uniform consumer price
across all its stores, even though the stores are facing different local market conditions. The
pricing may be truly national in the sense that all stores have the same price, but it may
also be that groups of stores charge the same price at a regional (sub-national) level. The
alternative to national or regional pricing is that each local store has a unique price based
on the local demand characteristics.
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Whether chain-store groups adopt national or local prices varies from sector to sector and
sometimes also within a sector. A recent study by DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2019) finds
that most U.S. food, drugstore, and mass-merchandise chains charge national or regional
prices, even though there is large variation in demographics and competition across the
different regional and local markets. Dobson and Waterson (2005) report that UK electrical
goods retailers predominately use national prices, US offi ce supply superstores adopt local
prices, and in the UK supermarket sector some groups price uniformly and others price
locally.1 This variation in incidence of national prices suggests that a strategy of strictly
local pricing may not always be optimal.
When analyzing retail markets, competition authorities will often assume, either implic-
itly or explicitly, that businesses react optimally to local market conditions. However, given
the incidence of national and regional pricing, as indicated by the data, this will in many
cases be a wrong assumption. It is therefore important that we understand (i) how and
when firms choose to adopt national pricing strategies, (ii) what national pricing means for
the competition between the firms, and (iii) what are the consequences for the consumers
locally and for welfare more generally.
An important characteristic of most retail markets is that competition is multidimen-
sional. Retailers clearly compete for consumers by setting prices, but consumers’choice of
retail outlet for their purchases also depends on a set of other characteristics. Consumers
may care about store location, opening hours and a wide range of in-store activities per-
formed by each local retailer, ranging from display and restocking of products in the shelves
to friendliness towards customers. It seems reasonable to expect that the nature of such
non-price competition has an impact on the optimal pricing strategies.
The key issues analyzed in this paper are why chain-stores sometimes use national prices
and sometimes pure local prices, and what are the determinants for the choice of pricing
strategy. We formalize a model of spatial competition with two retail chains with chain-
stores in two local markets. Although each local market is a duopoly, the two markets may
differ in terms of market size and competition intensity. In each market each store offers a
good at a price and with a set of other characteristics dubbed as “quality”. Thus, quality
is meant to encompass all other characteristics important for consumer demand than the
price of the good. The provision of quality is costly and observable, but non-verifiable, since
important dimensions of quality are hard to measure. This implies that it is not possible for
a chain to commit to a national quality standard and quality is therefore decided locally by
each store. We also allow for the possibility that the costs of quality provision may or may
not be fully internalized by the chain. Prices, on the other hand, may be determined by each
chain either locally or nationally, the latter meaning that prices will be equal in both local
markets. In this model we investigate whether it can be an equilibrium that one or both
1For more evidence of national pricing, see also Hitsch et al. (2017).
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retail chains adopt a national pricing strategy, under what circumstances national pricing
will arise, and the welfare implications thereof.
The literature on national pricing is rather limited. At some level it is related to the ex-
tensive literature on third-degree price discrimination2, but while the focus in this literature
is how firms may exploit differences in demand conditions, the focus in the national pricing
literature is in some sense the opposite: How can it be rational not to price discriminate
according to differences in market conditions? The prevailing theories mostly center around
a dampening-of-competition story (Dobson and Waterson, 2005; Guo and Zhang, 2015).
When committing to a national price a firm deviates from the local profit-maximizing price
in all markets. The benefit is that the price and the profit are increased in markets with
more competition, but the downside is that prices and profits are reduced in markets where
the firm enjoys more market power. Hence the profitability of national prices depends on the
composition of market characteristics the firm is faced with. The relatively less important
monopoly markets are for the total revenues of the firm, the more likely it is that a firm will
choose a national pricing strategy.3
DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2019) suggest a series of alternative explanations for national
pricing (none of them formalized). They argue that the two most plausible explanations,
backed up by discussions and interviews with chain managers, consultants, and industry
analysts, are (i) managerial inertia (various behavioral factors that prevent the firms from
implementing optimal pricing policies), and (ii) brand image concerns (the idea being that
different prices at different stores may lead to negative reactions from consumers, which
ultimately may lead to reduced demand in the long run).
There has also been some attempts at estimating welfare consequences of national pricing.
Adams and Williams (2019) quantify the welfare effects of national (zone) pricing with data
from the US retail home-improvement industry. They conclude that national pricing softens
competition in markets where firms compete, but it shields consumers from higher prices in
rural markets. Overall, they conclude that national prices result in higher consumer surplus
than local pricing.
The paper closest to ours is Dobson and Waterson (2005) (DW henceforth). These
authors analyze a model with a single upstream chain that serves a number of local markets.
Each local market is either a large market that supports local competition or smaller markets
where the chain enjoys a monopoly position. Specifically, they assume that in the large
markets the chain-store faces competition from a single local independent retailer. Market
2Seminal contributions on the effects of third-degree price discrimination in imperfectly competitive
markets include Holmes (1989), Corts (1998) and Armstrong and Vickers (2001).
3Li et al. (2018) empirically analyze the profitability of national versus local chain-store pricing using
data from the US digital camera industry. They conclude that the optimal pricing policy depends on the
profile of the chains, with national pricing being more profitable for two of the three main chains in the
industry analyzed.
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demand is derived from a representative consumer model. In this model they show that
the chain-store would sometimes prefer to use national prices. There are two countervailing
effects. On one side national prices tend to soften competition in the larger duopoly markets,
but on the other side national prices reduce profits in the monopoly markets. This trade-
off may favour national prices if the monopoly markets are not too large (or not to many)
compared to the competitive markets. DW also show that national prices have an ambiguous
effect on social welfare and consumers’surplus.
Our approach differs from DW in several respects. First, while DW have one chain
and one independent retailer that can only be active in the larger markets, we have two
chains that are active in all markets. Moreover, whereas DW assume competition only in
the larger markets, we allow competition in all markets and we allow competition intensity
to be independent of market size. Another difference is our demand model where we use
a spatial model with fixed total demand. And most importantly, our model allows for
multidimensional competition, i.e., competition both on price and quality, which is the key
to understand incentives for national pricing.4
Our key results are the following. First, absent competition along the quality dimension,
we find that national prices will never arise as an equilibrium outcome in our model.5 This
result holds regardless of the differences in size and competition intensity across the two
markets. This shows that the results in DW are not general and are sensitive to specific
formulations about demand and market characteristics. However, when firms compete with
both price and quality, equilibria with national pricing by either one or both chains will
arise provided that competition along the quality dimension is suffi ciently strong. Thus, we
identify the presence of local quality competition as being potentially a key driver of national
pricing strategies.
The effects of national pricing on consumers’surplus and total welfare are non-trivial.
A switch form local to national pricing will induce opposite price and quality effects in the
two markets, and a typical outcome will be that consumers in one market benefit at the
expense of a loss for the consumers in the other. This is the typical effects we also get in
models where there is no quality competition, and we must weigh the benefits against the
loss. However, in our model it is also possible that all consumers gain from national pricing.
This may happen when the two markets are suffi ciently asymmetric. In this case, both
price and quality may decrease in one market and increase in the other in such a way that
the effect of the price drop dominates the quality drop in the first market, and the quality
4In the literature on third-degree price discrimination there are some papers that incorporate a quality
dimension, but typically either in a monopoly framework (e.g., Ikeda and Toshimitsu, 2010) or with exogenous
quality differences between firms (e.g., Galera et al., 2017). None of these papers analyze how the presence
of local quality competition affects the incentives for national versus local pricing in retail markets.
5This result has some parallels to Thisse and Vives (1988) who find that price discrimination is the
unique equilibrium in a setting of spatially continuous demand, where two competing firms choose between
uniform and location-specific prices.
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increase dominates the price increase in the second market. As a consequence, consumers in
both markets may benefit from national prices. Conversely, we also identify cases in which
the opposite occurs, that consumers in both markets are harmed by a switch from local to
national pricing. These are results that can only arise with multidimensional competition.
The total welfare effects of national pricing are also ambiguous. In our model with
fixed total demand, welfare does not depend directly on prices but only indirectly through
provided quality. Our most clear-cut result is that total welfare is maximized when both
chains practice local pricing and all quality costs are internalized by the chains, implying that
national pricing by one or both chains always implies a welfare loss compared to the case of
local pricing. When seen in conjunction with the aforementioned effects of national pricing
on consumers’surplus, showing that national pricing tends to benefit some and sometimes
all consumers, this welfare result implies that the firms are often caught in a “prisoners’
dilemma”when choosing between a local or national pricing strategy.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. In the next section we
describe our basic model. In Sections 3 and 4 we analyze price and quality competition
between the chains under different assumptions about the pricing strategies (local versus
national). In Section 3 we derive the Nash equilibrium outcome when both chains practice
local pricing, whereas in Section 4 we derive the equilibrium prices and qualities when either
one or both chains practice national pricing. The pricing strategies are endogenized in
Section 5, where we characterize the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of a game where each
chain initially commits to either a local or a national pricing strategy. Finally, in Section 6
we explore the implications of national pricing for consumers and total welfare, and Section
7 concludes.
2 Model
Consider two national retail chains, indexed by i = 1, 2, that compete in two local markets,
indexed by j = A,B. Each local market is a duopoly where the retail store of Chain 1 (2)
is located at the left (right) endpoint of the unit line Zj = [0, 1]. The store of Chain i in
Market j offers a good with quality sji at price p
j
i . Consumers are uniformly distributed
along Zj and each consumer demands one unit of the good from the most preferred retailer.
The utility of a consumer located at x ∈ Zj is given by
U j (x) =
{
v + bsji − p
j
i − tjx if i = 1
v + bsji − p
j
i − tj (1− x) if i = 2
, (1)
where b > 0 is the marginal willingness to pay for quality and tj > 0 is a transportation
cost parameter that captures the degree of horizontal product differentiation, and therefore
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inversely captures the intensity of competition, in Market j. The utility parameter v >
0 is assumed to be suffi ciently large such that both markets are always fully covered in
equilibrium.
The two markets differ along two dimensions; competition intensity and market size.
Differences along the former dimension are captured by tA 6= tB, whereas differences along
the latter dimension are captured by assuming that the total mass of consumers in Market
A (B) is given by mA (mB), where mA 6= mB. Thus, we allow for the possibility that the
intensity of competition is stronger in either the larger or the smaller market.
Under the assumption that all consumers make utility-maximizing decisions, the demand



















The demand facing Chain 2 in Market j is then given by qj2 = m
j − qj1. Note that tj is a
measure of “general”competition intensity between the stores in Market j where differences
in both price and quality matter. On the other hand, for any given tj, the parameter b
scales up and down the importance of differences in quality relative to differences in price for
consumers’choice. When we in the following discuss effects of more or less competition, this
will refer to what we above dubbed as general competition intensity. In contrast, when we
discuss stronger or weaker quality competition, this will refer to changes in the parameter b.
We assume that quality is observable but non-verifiable, since important dimensions of
quality are hard to measure. This implies that it is not possible for a chain to commit to a
national quality standard that applies to the stores in both markets. Thus, we assume that
quality is decided at each store to maximize local payoff, which might include both monetary
and non-monetary (effort) costs of quality provision. These costs are assumed to be identical














where k > 0 and c ∈ [0, b). Under these assumptions, higher quality provision implies a
fixed (i.e., output independent) cost and might also increase the marginal cost of supplying
the good (if c > 0).6 Furthermore, for a given supply of the good, it is increasingly costly
to increase the level of quality. With the underlying assumption of constant marginal costs
of supplying the good (for a given quality level), we set all other quality-independent costs
equal to zero, without further loss of generality. The payoff of Store i in Market j is then
















Whereas qualities are set to maximize local (store) payoff, prices are set to maximize chain










Here α ∈ [0, 1] represents the share of the local stores’total quality costs that are internalized
by the chain (i) when it decides whether or not to set a uniform national price, and (ii) at the
moment it decides its price level(s). The parameter α may for example represent contract
frictions that can arise if the chain is using a franchise model and contracts are incomplete.
Thus, α = 1 represents situations in which there are no contract frictions between the chain
and its local stores, such as for example when the local stores are fully owned by the chain.
We assume that the players are engaged in a non-cooperative game in which prices and
qualities in each market are set simultaneously, where prices are set to maximize chain
profits and qualities are set to maximize store payoffs. Although differences in local market
conditions imply that, all else equal, the profits of Chain i are maximized by setting different
prices in each market, we assume that each retail chain is able to commit to a national
pricing strategy, for example through national advertising campaigns, with a uniform price
that applies to both markets, if this is unilaterally profitable.7
3 Local pricing
Let us first consider the benchmark case of local pricing, where all decisions are market-
specific (and thus store-specific). Before deriving the Nash equilibrium, it is highly instructive
to spend some time detailing the nature of the strategic interaction between the players.
3.1 Strategic price and quality interactions
Under local pricing, all the main insights on the nature of the two-dimensional strategic
interaction between retail chains are obtained by focussing on one local market only. From
the first-order conditions of the profit-maximization problems, we obtain the following best-
7Keep in mind that a uniform price (or quality) is generally not a “local best response”in either of the
two markets. A Nash equilibrium with national pricing therefore requires some kind of commitment. A
national advertising campaign can be a credible commitment device as long as the advertised information is
verifiable, which is certainly the case for prices, but arguably not for quality. In Section 5.3 we explore if and
how our main results would change if the chains were also able to commit to a national quality standard.
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2 (bcmj + ktj)
mj. (7)
Due to symmetry, the best-response functions for Chain 2 are obviously completely equiva-
lent.
As expected, prices are strategic complements. A higher price by Chain 2 leads to
a demand increase, and therefore less price-elastic demand, for Chain 1, which optimally
responds by increasing the price. Qualities are also strategic complements, but only if c > 0.
A quality increase by Chain 2 leads to a demand reduction for Chain 1. If c > 0, this
demand reduction reduces the marginal cost of quality provision, and Chain 1 will therefore
optimally respond by choosing a higher level of quality. Otherwise, if c = 0, qualities are
strategically independent.
While own price is a strategic complement to the rival’s price, it is a strategic substitute
to the rival’s quality (i.e., ∂pj1/∂s
j
2 < 0). Increased quality provision by Chain 2 reduces
the demand, and therefore reduces the price-elasticity of demand, for Chain 1. The optimal
response by the latter chain is therefore to reduce the price. Conversely, own quality is a
strategic substitute to the rival’s price, but only if c > 0. A higher price by Chain 2 leads
to increased demand for Chain 1. If c > 0, this demand increase leads to a higher marginal
cost of quality provision, resulting in a lower optimal quality level by Chain 1.
Finally, notice that own price and own quality are what we can dub complementary
strategies (i.e., ∂pj1/∂s
j




1 > 0). All else equal, a higher price increases the
price-cost margin, which makes it more profitable to increase quality in order to attract
more customers. Conversely, an increase in quality leads to higher demand and therefore
makes demand less price-elastic, implying that the profit-maximizing price also increases.
The latter effect is reinforced if a quality increase also leads to higher marginal production
costs for the chain (which requires c > 0 and α > 0).
All the above strategic interactions are derived holding everything else constant, including
other decisions made by the same player. For example, the optimal price response is derived
keeping the quality decision of the same player constant, and vice versa. However, these
best responses are potentially different when we take into account that each player optimizes
along two different dimensions: price and quality. By internalizing the strategic relationship
between price and quality for each player, we derive a new set of best-response functions
that allow us to determine what we dub net strategic complementarity or substitutability.
These best-response functions, where each player’s best response is solely a function of
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(2ktj + c (b− αc)mj)
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(b− c)2 − (1− α) c (b+ c)
) . (9)
Whereas the strategic complementarity between prices remain, we see that this is not
the case for qualities. Keeping the price of Chain 1 constant, a quality increase by Chain
2 is optimally met by a quality increase by Chain 1 (if c > 0). However, a quality increase
by Chain 2 also gives Chain 1 an incentive to reduce the price, as explained above. Since
price and quality are complementary strategies, Chain 1 will optimally respond to Chain
2’s quality increase by reducing both price and quality. This is a dominating effect, making
qualities net strategic substitutes. We also see from (9) that own quality is a net strategic
complement to the rival’s price. Strategic complementarity in prices, combined with the fact
that own price and own quality are complementary strategies, imply that Chain 1 optimally
responds to a price increase (by Chain 2) by increasing both price and quality.
The above derived strategic interactions are useful in order to characterize what is a
key mechanism determining many of the subsequently derived results in this paper. How
does a unilateral price change affect the rival’s optimal quality choice when we internalize

























to obtain sj2 as a function of p
j







(2ktj −mjb (b− c)) pj1 + (2ktj + 3mjbc) tj
)
mj (b− c)
2ktj (4ktj −mjb2) + 2mjcktj (6b− α (b+ c)) + cb (b (4c− b)− αc (2b+ c)) (mj)2
,
(10)






> (<) 0 if 2ktj > (<)mjb (b− c) . (11)
Notice that b measures the relative intensity of competition along the quality dimension,
which allows us to reach the following conclusion:
Lemma 1 In a given market, a unilateral price increase by one chain leads to a higher
(lower) quality provision by the rival chain if the intensity of quality competition is suffi ciently
weak (strong) relative to the intensity of price competition.
The sign of (11) is determined by two main effects that pull in opposite directions:
1. Keeping the quality of Chain 1 constant, a price increase by Chain 1 leads to a price
increase by Chain 2 (because prices are strategic complements), which in turn leads to
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a quality increase by Chain 2 (because own price and own quality are complementary
strategies). In other words, this is the effect of own quality being a net strategic
substitute to the rival’s price.
2. However, since price and quality are complementary strategies, a price increase by
Chain 1 will be accompanied by a quality increase by the same chain. Since qualities
are net strategic substitutes, this leads to a quality reduction by Chain 2.
The relative strength of these two effects depends on the intensity of quality competi-
tion, which crucially determines the magnitude of the second effect, which depends on the
net strategic substitutability of qualities. The stronger the chains compete along the qual-
ity dimension, the larger is Chain 2’s loss of demand when Chain 1 increases the quality.
Consequently, the larger are the price and quality reductions by Chain 2. Thus, when b is
suffi ciently high, the second effect dominates, which means that each chain can induce a
quality reduction at the other chain by increasing the price. Otherwise, if b is suffi ciently
low, a unilateral price increase will instead trigger a quality increase by the rival chain.
3.2 Nash equilibrium
The symmetric Nash equilibrium is given by8
pjLL = t
j +
αc (b− c) tjmj
2ktj + (1− α) bcmj , (12)
sjLL =
(b− c) tjmj
2ktj + (1− α) bcmj . (13)
A comparison of equilibrium prices and qualities across the two markets reveals that
pALL > (<) p
B
LL if





4k2tAtB + (1− α) cb (2k (mAtB +mBtA) + c (b− αc)mAmB) , (14)
and
sALL > (<) s
B
LL if m








The main features of the Nash equilibrium with local pricing by both chains can therefore
be stated as follows:
8We use subscript LL to denote equilibrium values of the variables in the case where both chains adopt
a local pricing strategy.
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Proposition 1 Suppose that both retail chains set local prices. (i) If c = 0 or α = 0, the
equilibrium price is higher in the market with less competition. If c > 0 and α > 0, the
price might be higher in the market with more competition if this market is suffi ciently large
relative to the market with less competition. (ii) If α = 1 or c = 0, quality is higher in the
larger market. If c > 0 and α < 1, quality might be lower in the larger market if the degree
of competition is stronger in this market.
Proposition 1, whose proof follows from a straightforward inspection of (14) and (15),
reveals that the relationship between competition intensity and equilibrium prices is not
straightforward when competition takes place along two different dimensions. In the ab-
sence of quality competition, equilibrium prices are uniquely determined by the intensity
of competition (inversely measured by tj). This is a standard feature of spatial competi-
tion models with fixed total demand, where a unilateral price reduction has a pure business
stealing effect. This result survives the introduction of quality competition as long as quality
does not affect the chain’s marginal production costs (i.e., c = 0 or α = 0). However, for
c > 0 and α > 0, equilibrium prices also depend positively on market size. The reason is
that incentives for quality provision are stronger in a larger market, all else equal. If c > 0
(and α > 0), higher quality provision increases the marginal cost of supplying the good,
which in turns increases the profit-maximizing price. If this effect is suffi ciently strong, equi-
librium prices are higher in the market with a lower degree of competition, if this market is
suffi ciently larger than the other market.
Whereas the optimal price setting always depends (at least in part) on the degree of
competition, this is not necessarily the case for the choice of optimal quality provision. There
are two counteracting effects of competition intensity on quality choices. On the one hand,
stronger competition makes demand more quality-elastic, which gives each store an incentive
to increase quality. On the other hand, stronger competition also makes demand more
price-elastic. This gives each chain an incentive to reduce the price, which in turn reduces
the marginal gain of quality provision (recall that price and quality are complementary
strategies). If α = 1, such that prices and qualities are chosen to maximize the same
objective function, the two above mentioned effects exactly cancel each other, implying
that equilibrium quality provision is unaffected by the degree of competition.9 In this case,
equilibrium quality is always higher in the larger market.
However, this is not necessarily the case if α < 1, implying that some of the quality costs
are not internalized by the chain. If α < 1 and c > 0, more competition leads to lower
quality provision. This is explained by a subtle feedback effect. The former of the two above
explained effects (i.e., the increase in quality provision as a result of more quality-elastic
9This is a well known result from the spatial competition literature (e.g., Ma and Burgess, 1993, and
Gravelle, 1999). Brekke et al. (2010) have shown that this does not generally hold in the presence of income
effects (which implies that price changes affect the marginal utility of consumers).
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demand) is amplified by a feedback effect related to quality and price being complementary
strategies. Higher quality yields an incentive to increase the price, which in turn yields an
incentive for a further quality increase. The incentive to increase the price in response to
a quality increase is partly related to an increase in marginal production costs (if c > 0).
However, a lower value of α reduces the marginal cost increase for the chain, which in turn
reduces the magnitude of this feedback effect, as can be directly seen from (6), and therefore
reduces the former of the two above described effects of competition on quality provision.
Thus, if α < 1 and c > 0, the latter effect dominates the former, implying a negative
relationship between competition intensity and equilibrium quality provision. Consequently,
equilibrium quality might be lower in the larger market if the degree of competition is
suffi ciently strong in this market.
4 National pricing
In this section we analyze if and how the previously derived results (under local pricing)
change if either one or both chains adopt a national pricing strategy.
4.1 National pricing by one chain
Suppose that Chain 1 sets a national price, denoted p1, whereas Chain 2 practices local
pricing and sets pA2 and p
B
2 . As before, qualities are set to maximize (local) store payoff. In






















Naturally, the optimal national price set by Chain 1 depends on all decisions (prices and
qualities) made by both players in both markets. Nevertheless, the strategic relationships are
qualitatively similar to the ones analyzed in great detail in the previous section, under local
pricing by both chains, in the sense that the optimal national price depends positively on the
rival’s prices and on own qualities, but it depends negatively on the rival’s qualities. All other
best-response functions are identical to the ones under local pricing, and it can also be shown
that the previously derived results on net strategic substitutability or complementarity carry
over to the case of asymmetric pricing strategies.
The asymmetric Nash equilibrium, where one chain practices national pricing whereas
the other chain practices local pricing, is given by a set of prices and qualities whose explicit
expressions are highly involved and thus not presentable.10 We can nevertheless gain some
insights into the main mechanisms at play by considering the special case of c = 0, which
10The equilibrium solution was computed in Mathematica and further details are available upon request.
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implies that the value of α only affects chain profits and does not affect equilibrium prices



































(3ktj −mjb2) + b4m−jmj (mj +m−j) t−j



























and where −j refers to the other market than Market j.
In order to see how prices and qualities in each market are affected by the adoption









. This allows us to define three different regimes, depending on the
intensity of quality competition. In all three regimes, national price setting leads to higher
(lower) price and quality by Chain 1 in the market with more (less) competition, but the
strategic response from Chain 2 differs across the three regimes:12
Regime 1 If b2 < 2kθ, Chain 2 responds by increasing (reducing) price and quality in the
market with more (less) competition.
Regime 2 If 2kθ < b2 < 2kθ, Chain 2 responds by either reducing or increasing price and
quality in both markets.
Regime 3 If b2 > 2kθ, Chain 2 responds by increasing (reducing) both price and quality in
the market with less (more) competition.
By committing to national price setting, Chain 1 can affect competition along two di-
mensions; price and quality. In the absence of quality competition, the strategic gain of
11We use subscript NL to denote equilibrium values of the chain practicing national pricing and subscript
LN to denote equilibrium values of the competing chain (practicing local pricing).
12These regimes are defined by equilibrium price and quality differences when comparing the case of local
pricing by both chains with the asymmetric case of national pricing by one of the chains. See the Appendix
for details.
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national price setting is that the optimal national price is higher than the optimal price in
the most competitive market under local price setting, which dampens competition in this
market because of strategic complementarity. However, this strategic gain comes at a cost,
which is the loss in profits due to the national price being suboptimally low in the market
with less competition.
When the chains also compete along a second dimension, namely quality, the strategic
gains and costs of national price setting are affected in non-trivial ways. A key factor is
the direction of the rival’s equilibrium quality response to the price changes introduced by
national price setting. This strategic response is characterized by Lemma 1. If the intensity
of quality competition (as measured by b) is suffi ciently low, the rival chain responds to a
price increase (reduction) by providing higher (lower) quality. In Regime 1, this is the nature
of the strategic response in both markets. National price setting consequently implies that
quality competition is reinforced (dampened) in the market with more (less) competition.
Thus, the strategic gain of national price setting that is related to quality competition occurs
in the market with less competition, whereas the cost occurs in the other market. In other
words, quality competition reduces both the gain and the cost of national price setting,
compared to the case where the chains are only engaged in price competition.
However, a suffi ciently high intensity of quality competition changes the direction of this
strategic response. In Regime 2, the sign of ∂s2 (p1) /∂p1 is different in the two markets,
which implies that the direction of Chain 2’s strategic response is reversed in one of the
markets, compared with Regime 1. Consequently, Chain 2 will respond to national pricing
by either reducing or increasing price and quality in both markets. A suffi cient condition for
a price and quality reduction by Chain 2 in both markets is that the competition intensity is
higher in the larger market. Finally, in Regime 3, ∂s2 (p1) /∂p1 < 0 in both markets, which
implies that the strategic response of Chain 2 is completely reversed, compared with Regime
1.
The above analysis shows that, depending on the regime, the price and quality responses
by Chain 2 either dampen or reinforce the effects of national price setting (by only Chain
1) on the price difference and quality difference between the two chains in each market. In
Regime 1, the price and quality differences are dampened by the strategic response of Chain
2, whereas these differences are reinforced in Regime 3. However, in the asymmetric Nash
equilibrium, regardless of the direction of the strategic responses, the price and the quality
of Chain 1 are higher (lower) than the price and quality of Chain 2 in the market with more
(less) competition.
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4.2 National pricing by both chains

















































































Comparing the equilibrium prices and qualities under local and national pricing, i.e.,
comparing (12)-(13) with (22)-(23), we can express the price and quality differences as fol-
lows:





















From these expressions, the following conclusions are immediate:
Proposition 2 If both chains switch from local to national price setting, this leads to a price
reduction (increase) in the market with the highest (lowest) price. In each market, quality
and price changes go in the same direction.
5 National versus local pricing
In this section we endogenize each chain’s pricing strategy by considering an extended game
that are played in two stages. In the first stage, each chain decides whether to commit to
a national pricing strategy or to set local prices. In the second stage, prices and qualities
are decided as in the previous sections. Using backwards induction, there are three possible
pure-strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE):
1. Local pricing by both chains, which is an SPNE if ΠLL ≥ ΠNL.
13In line with previous notation, we use subscript NN to denote equilibrium values in the case where
both chains adopt a national pricing strategy.
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2. National pricing by both chains, which is an SPNE if ΠNN ≥ ΠLN .
3. Local pricing by one chain and national pricing by the other chain, which is an SPNE
if ΠNL ≥ ΠLL and ΠLN ≥ ΠNN .
5.1 Pure price competition
As a benchmark for comparison, consider first the special case in which there is no quality
competition and the two chains compete purely in prices. This case is captured by b = 0,
which also implies c = 0. Setting b = c = 0 and comparing equilibrium profits across the
different pricing regimes, it is easily verified that
















Proposition 3 In the absence of quality competition, local pricing by both chains is the
unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
In other words, the results of Dobson andWaterson (2005) do not carry over to our spatial
framework with fixed total demand. Regardless of the differences in size and competition
intensity across the two markets, the profit gain obtained by relaxing competition in the
more competitive market (through national price setting) is always outweighed by the profit
loss suffered by a suboptimally low price in the less competitive market.14
5.2 Price and quality competition
Consider now the more general case in which the two chains compete along two different
dimensions; price and quality. Due to analytical intractability, we resort to numerical simula-
tions, illustrated by graphical plots, in order to identify the subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
14There are several differences between our model framework and the one used by Dobson and Waterson
(2005). For example, whereas they use a Bowley-type demand system based on a representative consumer,
our analysis is conducted within a spatial competition framework with fixed total demand. The latter
assumption, which implies that competition takes the form of pure business-stealing, tends to reinforce the
profit gain (loss) of relaxed (intensified) price competition. In other words, both the gains and losses from
a national price setting strategy tend to be larger when total demand is fixed.
16
5.2.1 “Weak”quality competition with full cost internalization
As a benchmark case, we consider parameter configurations that correspond to Regime 1
in Section 4.1, in which the quality competition is suffi ciently weak relative to the degree
of price competition. This regime is characterized by a positive relationship, within a given
market, between the price of one chain and the quality offered by the competing chain
(cf. Lemma 1). We also assume that all costs of quality provision are fully internalized
by the chain (i.e., α = 1). In Figures 1a—1d, we show the equilibrium configurations in(
tA,mA
)
-space for b = 1.5 and k = 0.85, and for different values of the cost parameter c
(successively increasing in each figure). In each figure we set tB = 4− tA and mB = 2−mA,
implying that we measure relative competition intensity and market size along the horizontal
and vertical axes, respectively. By design, each figure is thus symmetric around the point(
tA,mA
)
= (2, 1). In the North-East and South-West quadrants (defined according to the
symmetry point), competition is less intense in the larger market. In the remaining space (the
North-West and South-East quadrants), competition is more intense in the larger market.
In each figure, the red (orange) areas depict the parameter space in which the unique SPNE
has national pricing by both chains (one chain). In the remaining (white) areas, the unique
SPNE has local pricing by both chains.
Consider first Figure 1a, in which the level of quality provision does not affect marginal
production costs (c = 0). Here we see that, in contrast to the case of no quality competition,
national pricing by one or both chains appears as an equilibrium outcome, and the scope
for national pricing in equilibrium is larger if the difference in market size is relatively high
while the difference in competition intensity is relatively low. Notice, however, that an SPNE
with national pricing occurs within the chosen parameter range only if competition is more
intense in the smaller market.
We can explain this result by considering the incentives for a unilateral switch from local
to national pricing, as in Section 4.1. Recall that such a switch implies a price and quality
increase (reduction) in the market with more (less) intense competition. Recall also that the
competing chain strategically responds in the same manner (in Regime 1). Thus, a unilateral
switch to national pricing relaxes price competition but intensifies quality competition in
one market, and intensifies price competition but relaxes quality competition in the other
market. Put differently, the presence of quality competition reduces both the gains and costs
of national price setting.
From Proposition 3 we know that national pricing is not unilaterally profitable in the
absence of quality competition. Thus, for national pricing to be unilaterally profitable in the
presence of quality competition, the gains from relaxed quality competition in one market
must be suffi ciently higher than the losses from intensified quality competition in the other
market. This depends in turn on whether these gains occur in the larger or smaller market.
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Figure 1. Equilibrium pricing strategies under “weak”quality competition and full cost
internalization. The red (orange) area has national pricing by both chains (one chain).
Because of quality cost convexity, the profit gain from a marginal relaxation of quality
competition is larger the higher the equilibrium quality level is to begin with. And vice
versa, the profit loss from a marginal intensification of quality competition is lower the
smaller the equilibrium quality level is to begin with. From Proposition 1 we know that,
for c = 0, equilibrium quality is higher in the larger market under local pricing by both
chains. This implies that a unilateral switch to national price setting can be profitable only
if this leads to quality competition being relaxed in the larger market. But this requires that
national price setting leads to lower prices in the larger market, which in turn requires that
competition is less intense in this market.15 Thus, in the absence of output-dependent costs
of quality provision, national pricing (by one or both chains) is an SPNE only for parameter
15If c = 0, equilibrium prices are always lower (higher) in the market with more (less) intense competition
under local price setting (cf. Proposition 1).
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configurations where competition is less intense in the larger market.
This result changes if higher quality provision implies higher marginal production costs
(i.e., if c > 0). In each of Figures 1b—1d, there exists a parameter set with national pricing as
equilibrium strategies in cases where competition is more intense in the larger market, and
this set is larger when c is higher. The intuition is related to the ranking of equilibrium prices
under local price setting, which is analytically given by (14) and summarized in Proposition
1. If c is strictly positive, and if market sizes are different, the equilibrium price (under local
pricing) is higher in the market with more competition if this market is larger and if the
difference in competition intensity between the markets is suffi ciently low. Or equivalently,
for a given difference in competition intensity, the equilibrium price is higher in the market
with more competition if this market is suffi ciently larger than the other market. In these
cases, national price setting implies that price and quality go down in the larger market,
which in turn paves the way for national pricing as an equilibrium outcome in cases where
competition is more intense in the larger market.16 The equilibrium configurations displayed
in Figures 1b—1d also reveal that, if national pricing is an equilibrium strategy in cases where
competition is more intense in the larger market, it is an equilibrium strategy for both chains.
5.2.2 “Strong”quality competition with full cost internalization
Now consider cases in which competition is relatively stronger along the quality dimension.
In Figures 2a—2d we display the equilibrium configurations for a higher value of b, namely
b = 2, while maintaining all other parameter values at the same levels as in Figures 1a—
1d. In addition to the previously defined color codes, black-striped areas depict parameter
configurations for which no SPNE exists.
Consider first Figure 2a, which shows the equilibrium configurations for c = 0. Compared
with Figure 1a, there are two notable differences. First, within the chosen parameter range,
national pricing is an equilibrium strategy (by one or both chains) for a larger set of para-
meter values. Second, and perhaps more importantly, this set covers predominantly cases in
which competition is more intense in the larger market. These differences are related to the
nature of the strategic responses to national price setting, as analyzed in Section 4.1. The
parameter configurations considered in Figure 2a correspond to Regime 2 and 3 (as defined
in Section 4.1), where a price increase (reduction) by one chain is met by a quality reduction
(increase) by the competing chain in one (Regime 2) or both (Regime 3) markets.
Consider, for simplicity, the case of Regime 3. A unilateral switch from local to national
pricing by one chain implies that the price and quality go up (down) in the market with more
(less) intense competition (as long as c = 0). For parameter configurations corresponding
to Regime 3, the competing chain will respond by reducing (increasing) price and quality in
16As long as α = 1, equilibrium quality is always higher in the larger market under local pricing, even if
c > 0 (cf. Proposition 1).
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Figure 2. Equilibrium pricing strategies under “strong”quality competition and full cost
internalization. The red (orange) area has national pricing by both chains (one chain).
White stripes indicate that there are two equilibria, the second one with local pricing by
both chains. (Gray stripes indicate that the stability conditions are violated.)
the market with more (less) competition. Since, by assumption, competition is strong along
the quality dimension relative to the price dimension, the quality changes have a stronger
effect than the price changes on demand reallocations between the two chains. The above
described quality responses imply that the chain that switches to national price setting will
experience a demand gain (loss) in the market with more (less) intense competition, and the
gain will more than offset the loss if the market with more intense competition is suffi ciently
larger than the other market. This effect explains that national price setting can arise as an
equilibrium outcome in cases where competition is more intense in the larger market, even
if the costs of quality provision do not affect marginal production costs.
However, as we successively increase the value of c in Figures 2b—2d, the parameter
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configuration eventually switches back to Regime 1. This can be seen from (11), which shows
that a higher value of c increases the scope for a positive strategic relationship between own
price and rival’s quality, which is the characteristic feature of Regime 1 as defined in Section
4.1. Thus, the equilibrium configurations in Figures 2c and 2d are very similar to the ones
displayed in Figures 1c and 1d. Although the value of b is higher in the former set of figures,
the qualitative nature of the strategic relationship between the two chains is similar in both
sets.
5.2.3 “Weak”quality competition with no cost internalization
Finally, let us explore the importance of quality cost internalization by the chains. Suppose
that α = 0, implying that all quality costs are borne by the stores and not internalized by
the chains at any stage of the game. Note that with α < 1, because the chain does not fully
internalize the stores’profits, the specific division of revenues and profits (the sharing rule)
will affect the outcome (unlike the case when α = 0). In the following we will assume that
the chain and the stores use a 50-50 revenue sharing rule, but with all quality costs borne
by the local stores (α = 0). The equilibrium configurations in this scenario are displayed in
Figures 3a—3d, for the same parameter values (except for α) as in Figures 1a—1d.
Compared with Figures 1a—1d, there are two notable differences. First, national pricing
is an equilibrium strategy for a much larger set of parameter values when quality costs are
not internalized by the chains. Second, national pricing is an equilibrium mainly for cases
in which competition is more intense in the larger market, even in the absence of output-
dependent quality costs (as in Figure 3a).
Consider once more the effect a unilateral switch from local to national pricing. Recall
that, if α = 0, the price is lower in the market with more intense competition (cf. Proposition
1), implying that national pricing yields a price increase in this market and a price reduction
in the other. Thus, for given quality levels, national pricing yields a gain (loss) in the most
(less) competitive market. In the absence of quality competition, the gain is smaller than
the loss (cf. Proposition 3). The presence of quality competition implies additional gains
and losses related to changes in demand and in the costs of quality provision. However,
changes in the costs of quality provision are irrelevant for the optimal pricing strategy of
the chains, as long as these costs are not internalized. The only effects that matter for
the chains, with respect to quality competition, are the demand effects brought about by
changes in relative quality provision. Since prices are strategic complements, and since price
and quality move in the same direction for each store, national pricing by one chain implies
that both price and quality go up (down) for both chains in the market with more (less)
intense competition. However, since the strategic responses are smaller in magnitude than
the initial changes in price and quality by the chain that switches to national pricing, the
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Figure 3. Equilibrium pricing strategies under “weak” quality competition and no cost
internalization. The red area has national pricing by both chains. White stripes indicate
that there are two equilibria, the second one with local pricing by both chains.
latter chain offers higher (lower) quality than its competitor in the more (less) competitive
market. Thus, when quality costs are not internalized, the presence of quality competition
increases both the gains and the costs of national pricing. It turns out that these added
demand effects of changes in relative quality provision are suffi cient to make the gains of
national pricing outweigh the costs, if the market with more intense competition (where the
gains occur) is larger than the other market (where the losses occur). Notice also that all
equilibria with national pricing in Figures 3a—3d have national pricing by both chains. Thus,
if it is profitable for one chain to switch from local to national pricing, it is also profitable
for the competing chain to follow suit.
Summing up, we have already shown analytically (by Proposition 3) that national pricing
is never a Nash equilibrium in the absence of quality competition. Due to continuity, this
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must also hold for values of b suffi ciently close to zero. The above analysis, based on numerical
simulations for b > c ≥ 0, therefore allows us to reach the following conclusion:
Proposition 4 If the degree of local quality competition is suffi ciently strong, there exist
parameter sets in which the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium implies national pricing by
either one or both chains.
When seen in conjunction, Propositions 3 and 4 suggest that the presence of local quality
competition enlarges the scope for national pricing to be an equilibrium strategy. This is a
key result emanating from our analysis.
5.3 National quality standards
A potential concern with the above analysis is that we have assumed that quality is decided
locally and that the chain is unable to commit to a national quality standard. Although
we argue that this is a reasonable assumption due to non-verifiability of quality, it might
nevertheless be interesting to know whether equilibrium outcomes in which both chains set
local qualities but one or both chains set a national price (indicated by the red and orange
areas in Figures 1-3), survive if we allow either firm to commit to a national quality standard.
In the following we will focus on the cases in which the chain and local stores act like
they are vertically integrated (i.e., α = 1). First, we may note that the equilibrium outcomes
depicted in Figure 1, with local qualities and either one or two national prices, all survive
when a uniform quality standard is feasible. This suggests that our results are robust to the
assumption of national quality standards, at least for some parameter values.
When we analyze the cases in Figure 2, on the other hand, in which the degree of quality
competition is stronger (b = 2), we find that the outcomes with local qualities and either
one or two national prices will survive in part of the parameter space, but not everywhere.
In Figure 4a we have replicated the case presented in Figure 2a (b = 2, c = 0). Next to it,
in Figure 4b, we depict (in gray) the areas in which the outcomes with local qualities (and
either one or two national prices) do not survive. In other words, in the gray areas it is
profitable for at least one of the chains to deviate to a strategy that in some way involves a
uniform quality standard. Nevertheless, we can see that, at least for this particular example,




-space in which the equilibrium outcome has local
qualities with either one or two national prices.
6 Welfare effects of national pricing
How are the consumers in the two markets affected by the retail chains’choice of pricing
strategy? And what are the effects on total welfare? Below we address these two questions
in turn.
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Figure 4. The gray region shows the area in which equilibria with national prices and local
qualtities do not surive (when a national quality standard is feasible).
6.1 Consumer welfare
Since the price and quality effects of a switch from local to national pricing usually go in
opposite directions in the two markets, a typical outcome is that consumers in one market
benefit at the expense of a lower consumers’surplus in the other market. However, this is
not necessarily the case if the markets are suffi ciently asymmetric along the two dimensions
considered (competition intensity and market size), as we will show below.
If we compare the two symmetric equilibria with, respectively, local and national pricing
by both chains, relative prices and qualities are the same in both markets in both equilibria,













If prices go up as a result of national pricing, consumers’surplus increases only if consumers’
valuation of the corresponding quality increase more than outweighs the price increase, and








(2ktj − b (b− c)mj) (2kt−j + bc (1− α)m−j)
Φ
. (30)
Recall that Φ > 0. The sign of (30) is therefore determined by the signs of the first two
bracketed factors in the numerator. If the price is higher in Market j under local pricing
(pjLL > p
−j
LL), national pricing —which then leads to a lower price in Market j —benefits
consumers in this market if the relative degree of quality competition is suffi ciently low, such
that 2ktj > b (b− c)mj. If the latter condition also holds for the other market, consumers
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in that market will suffer as a result of national pricing, because the quality increase is
not suffi cient to compensate for the price increase. From (11), we see that this case is
characterized by a positive strategic relationship between own price and rival’s quality in
both markets, and corresponds to what we have dubbed Regime 1 in the previous analysis.
However, if the markets are suffi ciently asymmetric, the sign of 2ktj − b (b− c)mj might
differ in the two markets. Suppose for example that tA > tB and mA < mB, such that
2ktA > b (b− c)mA and 2ktB < b (b− c)mB. This case corresponds to what we have defined










/∂pB−i < 0. In this
case, national pricing by both chains implies that price and quality go down in Market A but
increase in Market B, which is the largest and most competitive market. In Market A, the
price reduction is suffi ciently large to increase consumers’surplus, despite the corresponding
drop in quality. However, in Market B, where national pricing leads to higher prices and
quality, the quality increase more than outweighs the increase in price, leading to a larger
surplus to consumers also in this market. Thus, national pricing benefits consumers in both
markets.17
To say something more about the relationship between (i) the effects of national pricing
on consumers’surplus, and (ii) the market size and degree of competition in each market, it










which is the mean market size and the mean unit transportation cost of the two markets.
Using (30), we may then state the following proposition, which compares the situation with
national pricing by both chains to the situation with local pricing by both chains.
Proposition 5 (i) Suppose that prices are lowest in Market j under local pricing, pjLL < p
−j
LL.
National pricing by both chains then yields strictly higher consumers’surplus in both markets





b (b− c) ,








Similarly, national pricing by both chains yields strictly lower consumers’ surplus in both
markets compared to local pricing, as long as Market j is suffi ciently small (and Market −j
17Notice that such an outcome is impossible if there is only price competition (i.e., in the absence of local
quality competition), in which case national price setting implies a gain (loss) for consumers in the market
where the price goes down (up).
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Figure 5. The figure replicates the example from Figure 1a, but allowing for a wider range
of market sizes. The green (blue) area has consumers’surplus going up (down) when both
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(ii) Suppose instead that prices are highest in Market j under local pricing, pjLL > p
−j
LL.
National pricing by both chains then yields strictly higher consumers’surplus in both markets
compared to local pricing, as long as Market j is suffi ciently small (and Market −j suffi ciently
large), mj < m (tj), and strictly lower consumers’surplus in both markets as long as Market
j is suffi ciently large, mj > m (tj).
To get a sense of how national pricing affects consumers’surplus in equilibrium, we have
plotted two new figures above, Figures 5 and 6. In Figure 5 we have replicated the case
from Figure 1a (b = 1.5, c = 0), except we allow for a wider range of market sizes (on
the vertical axis), and we now only color the areas in which national pricing by both chains
is an equilibrium outcome. In the blue (green) area in Figure 5, consumers’surplus goes
down (up) in both markets when both chains move from local to national pricing. In the
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Figure 6. The figure replicates the example from Figure 2a. The green area has consumers’
surplus going up when both chains moves to national pricing.
red area, national pricing causes consumers’surplus to go up in one market and down in
the other. In Figure 6 we have replicated the case from Figure 2a (using the same range
of market sizes). In this example, in which the degree of quality competition is stronger
(b = 2, c = 0), consumers’surplus goes up in both markets under national pricing for a wide
range of parameter values (the green area). In concordance with the above analysis, we see
that the green and blue areas in these figures are all characterized by suffi ciently asymmetric
markets, where competition is more intense in the larger market.
6.2 Total welfare
In order to derive the effect of national pricing on total welfare, it is instructive first to derive
the socially optimal levels of quality provision in the two markets. Since, by assumption,
both chains have the same costs, the socially optimal outcome implies equal quality provision
across the two stores in each market (but not necessarily across the two markets). Further-
more, the assumption of fixed total demand implies that social welfare does not depend
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directly on prices. Under symmetry, total welfare in Market j is given by18












where sj is the quality provided by each of the two stores in Market j. Maximizing (33)





By comparing (34) with (13), it is easy to confirm that the socially optimal quality level
corresponds to the equilibrium quality level under local pricing, if all quality costs are inter-
nalized by the chain. Thus, under local pricing and full cost internalization, socially optimal
quality provision is achieved in equilibrium. This confirms the equivalent result derived by
Ma and Burgess (1993), who also show that this result hinges critically on the assumption
of simultaneous price and quality decisions.19
As long as national price setting affects local quality provision, which we have shown that
it generally does, the above result has an obvious implication for the total welfare effect of
















)2 − (sjLL)2) . (35)
Setting α = 1, and using (13) and (23), the effect is given by
















8k ((mAtB +mBtA) k +mAmBbc)2
< 0. (36)
Thus, under full cost internalization (α = 1), total welfare is always lower when both chains
set national rather than local prices. Since, under local pricing, each store provides a so-
cially optimal level of quality, national pricing implies a distortion of quality provision away
from the social optimum in each market. In other words, since qualities are already at the
welfare-maximizing level in each market under local pricing, national pricing reduces welfare
regardless of whether quality increases or decreases. This is clearly true also in the case
where only one chain practices national pricing. Thus:
Proposition 6 If quality costs are fully internalized by the chains, total welfare is maximized
if both chains practice local pricing.
18Notice that total transportation costs are also minimsed in a symmetric outcome, where the indifferent
consumer is located at the midpoint of Zj .
19If quality and prices are chosen sequentially, firms have an incentive to set suboptimally low quality in
order to dampen price competition.
20∆W measures the change in total welfare if both chains adopt national instead of local pricing.
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Notice that this result also applies to the cases where national pricing benefits consumers
in both markets (e.g., the green areas in Figure 5). In these cases, a switch from national to
local pricing would lead to an increase in chain profits that would more than outweigh the
loss in consumers’surplus. The following implication is immediate:
Corollary 1 For parameter configurations that yield Nash equilibria where consumers in
both markets benefit from national pricing, the game is a Prisoners’Dilemma for the firms.
7 Concluding remarks
National pricing strategies are prevalent in many retail markets. At the same time it seems
clear that competition in most markets is multidimensional; firms not only compete on
the basis of prices, but on a wide range of other attributes ranging from opening hours to
customer friendliness and a lot of other things. In this paper we have dubbed these attributes
as quality. The basic question we ask is why firms may find it profitable to use a uniform
national pricing strategy over a wide range of different market conditions in local markets.
The most prominent theory of the received literature is that national pricing may lead to
a dampening-of-competition effect in markets with intense competition that may outweigh
the loss from lower prices in more concentrated local markets. We show that this main result
obtained from the previous literature is not particularly robust to different specifications of
demand and local market structure. In our model, absent competition along the quality
dimension, national pricing will never arise as an equilibrium outcome. This suggests that
multidimensional competition can be an important factor in explaining why firms choose
national pricing in some instances. We show that national pricing may be an equilibrium
strategy for at least one of the chains provided that the local quality competition is suffi ciently
strong.
With multidimensional competition, welfare implications are more complicated and harder
to assess. We show that national pricing might benefit consumers even in markets where
such a pricing strategy leads to higher prices. This raises challenges for competition policy.
Another important challenge to competition policy is how to assess mergers in markets where
either one or all firms adopt national pricing. Modern merger policies tend to look at pric-
ing pressure measures to evaluate effects of mergers and sometimes mergers are remedied
by requiring divestitures in local markets where the merging parties overlap. This policy
seems to presume that competition is one-dimensional in price only, and that pricing is lo-
cal. Needless to say, national pricing and multidimensional competition makes the task of
finding optimal merger remedies considerably more complicated. This and other interesting
aspects of national pricing are left for future research.
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Appendix: Definition of strategic regimes in Section 4.1
Notice first that, from (12)-(13), equilibrium quality in Market j when both chains practice
local price setting can be written as sjLL = (m
jb/2ktj) pjLL. Thus, the relationship between
price and quality for each chain, in each market, is exactly the same in the two equilibria
(local pricing by both chains versus national price setting by one chain). This implies that
equilibrium quality responses to national price setting always go in the same direction as the
equilibrium price responses. Using (12), (17) and (18), the price differences across the two
equilibria are given by












































, it follows from (A1)-(A2) that pNL >
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B > (<) tA. Furthermore, it follows from (A3)-(A4) that, if
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B > (<) tA. Finally, if 2kθ < b2 < 2kθ
(Regime 2), a closer inspection of (A3)-(A4) reveals that, if tj < t−j, then pALN < (>) p
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